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INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION:  








This  paper  deals  with  the  relation  between  the  human  right  to  migrate  and  the 
objectives of immigration policies. We argue that the temporary work migration is the 
clearest sign of the failure of political governance in both the host and native states, even 
if  we  may  argue,  to  a  different  degree.  The  only  way  to  reduce  the  pressure  of 
immigration in developed countries would be to allow a freer global environment, in 
trade, industrial and taxation policies. 
 
1. The present situation 
 
Among the core trends that define the contemporary process of globalization is the 
significant increase in cross border flows of workforce. While in 1990 there were 154 
millions of foreign residents on the Globe, in 2000 their number reached 175 millions 
(that  is,  approximately  3%  of  the  world  population)
1.  The  rate  of  growth  in  foreign 
residency surpasses the rate of growth of the world population and the foreign residents 
are sometimes called, due to their number, “the fifth largest country in the world”. 60% of 
them live and work in the developed countries, where 5% of the workforce has a foreign 
passport. United States of America absorbs 80% of the annual flow of individuals who 
leave developing countries in order to go to work in developed countries while Canada 
and Australia another 11%. 
The  amplitude  of  the  process  cannot  be  fully  revealed  unless  we  take  into 
consideration the so-called “irregulars”. They are individuals who breach somehow the 
regime for international movement of persons as they may be illegal immigrants (who 
illegally cross the borders), legal tourists who take a job (so they are not really tourists), 
persons  with  forged  documents  and  so  on,  comprising  another  10-15%  of  the  entire 
number of foreign residents. In United States of America, their number is conservatively 
assessed at around 10 millions, in a population of 300 millions
2 while in Western Europe 
the number of persons with an irregular status is appreciated – also conservatively – at 
around 4 millions. 
As a consequence, we witness a significant trend in the international economy by 
which an  increasing  number  of  individuals  choose to  work  (legally  or illegally)  in  a 
                                                            
*  Radu  Mu etescu  is  Assistant  Professor  of  International  Business  at  the  Academy  of 
Economic Studies in Bucharest. 
1 ILO (2004, p. 8); of course, the main motivation of a foreign resident is not always a higher 
wage but can be also political, security and other factors; 
2 GCIM (2005); other less official sources advance figures between 25-50 millions (maybe in 
order to determine a more radical political reaction).   
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foreign country. Such a development may seem to be a true paradox as the contemporary 
process  of  globalization also  comprises  freer  global flows of  commodities  or foreign 
direct investments. Why aren’t the latter sufficient to level the international differences in 
the price of factors of production and consumer products? Labor, together with land, has 
been  traditionally  considered  less  mobile  than  capital,  information  as  well  as  final 
products and even production activities.  
 
2. The right to migrate and immigration policies 
 
Individuals always attempt to maximize their personal welfare (which others call 
“psychic  profit”).  Personal  welfare  can  be  either  material  (an  individual  will  always 
attempt, ceteris paribus, to maximize his monetary income) or psychic (an individual will 
always  attempt  to  satisfy  his  subjective  preferences).  As  Hoppe  points  out,  „what 
constitutes welfare and wealth is subjective and one might prefer lower material living 
standards and a greater distance from certain other people over higher material living 
standards and a smaller distance”
1. 
 
A person who is born in a mountain village and loves living in such an environment, 
will not immediately go to work in a big city as soon as he is offered a larger wage. There 
are  subjective  considerations,  like  culture,  religion,  family,  social  bonding  but  also 
language  or  the  uncertainty  of  living  in  a  foreign  environment  that,  as  a  norm,  may 
prevent individuals from attempting to “always” choose the highest monetary income. 
We do not exclude the real possibility that working and living in a different community 
may represent by themselves personal preferences and certain individuals are even ready 
to incur different types of costs (monetary as well as psychic) in order to reach that goal. 
As a consequence, an individual may be willing to leave his large hometown and go to 
live and work in a small mountain village, where he may earn a smaller monetary income, 
just  because  he  values  more  the  fresh  air,  quietness  and  social  bonding  of  such  a 
community. 
Human beings seem to prefer, as a norm, to accomplish their lives in a community 
they feel they belong, with similar cultural, ethical (including political) and consumer 
values
2. There may also be significant exceptions. An European may discover that he 
feels closer to the values and customs of an Indian-Hindu community. In a world without 
frontiers, such an individual will leave his native community in order to live in a new 
environment. The fundamental issue is that any person who changes his location must 
observe the property rights of the others. As long as he does not become an aggressor, his 
liberty of movement is natural and is the purest manifestation of his own property rights. 
In a contemporary international context, „as long as the immigrant moves to a piece of 
                                                            
1 Hoppe (1998, p. 224). 
2 Internet and the proliferation of new communcations technologies, which also define the 
contemporary  globalization,  may  also  change  the  identity  of  the  people  and  their  feeling  of 
belonging.  Other  factors  than  ethnicity,  language  or  local  community  may  define  these  new 
dimenssion of identity, like ethical values, political values, entertainment and (neo)cultural value, 
and so on. Thse change of identity may become, even in a world without differences in income, a 
strong incentive of migration.  
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private property whose owner is willing to take him in (maybe for a fee), there can be 
nothing untoward towards such a transaction ... there is no freedom of movement of the 
person per se. This is always subject to the willingness of property owners in the host 
nation to accept the immigrant onto their land”
1. 
In fact, the right to migrate is only, on a free market, a right to transact as long as any 
“immigrant” must rent or buy property (generally speaking, land) from the owners in the 
community of destination. There is not such a right as the right to a have a car unless the 
individual who desires a car has the money to pay for that product
2. The real right to 
migrate is nothing but the right to freely exercise the property rights. As Rothbard points 
out, “the current immigration barriers restrict, not so much a „human right” to immigrate, 
but the right of property owners to rent or sell property to immigrants”
3. 
We  reach  a  vivid  debate  in  the  contemporary  social  sciences  and  public  policy 
regarding the correct immigration policy a state should adopt. On the one hand, there are 
free immigration policies where the state allows anyone to enter the country. On the other 
hand,  there  are  restricted  immigration  policies  where  the  state  forbids  any  foreign 
individual to enter the country. The most cited example of free immigration policy is the 
XIXth century USA while the best example of restricted immigration policy is present 
day Switzerland. We should however realize that two forms have never existed in their 
purest forms (or just for very short periods of time). In the case of XIXth century USA, 
there existed barriers in the path of Chinese immigration
4, for example. 
 
The correct answer to this debate, from the perspective of private property rights, is 
offered by Hoppe: „immigration, to be free in the same sense as trade is free, must be 
invited immigration”
5. Suppose that an American entrepreneur decides to invite on his 
property (in USA) and hire 1000 Mexican workers. The guest workers will live and work 
on his property and will in no way aggress against the property rights of other Americans. 
A political system that protects the property rights and the free exercise of these rights 
cannot  oppose  such  a  “migration”  without  infringing  the  rights  of  the  American 
entrepreneur. 
Moreover, „if the government excludes a person while there exist a domestic resident 
who wants to admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion; if 
the government admits a person while there exists no domestic resident who wants to 
have this person on his property, the result is forced integration”
6. As a consequence, 
restrictive  immigration  policies  not  only  aggress  against  the  property  rights  of  the 
immigrants (who are prevented from buying or renting land in destination countries) but 
                                                            
1 Block (1998, p. 173). 
2 Rothbard concludes that, in fact, the human rights are property rights. A human right should 
not impose a burden on others who are forced to pay for my right. 
3 Rothbard (1962, p. 550). 
4 West (1982, p. 38). Because of the fear that the Chinese would become a majority, the 
political elite banned from 1882 the immigration of Chinese (for 60 years). The same political 
debate was centered around the immigration of Italian Catholics at the beginning of the XXth 
century. The principle behind such an approach was to not let a particular ethnicity to dominate in 
the immigration flows. 
5 Hoppe (1998). 
6 Hoppe (1998, p. 230).  
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also of some of the citizens of the host countries (who are prevented from selling and 
leasing their property). 
 
3. Public goods and immigration 
 
In a society where all the resources (more specifically, land) are in private hands 
(private property), migration cannot occur unless the immigrants have the consent of the 
owners of the land. Otherwise, it is an outright invasion and aggression of property rights 
and the owners have the right to defend the integrity of their property. 
In the case of contemporary societies, a large part of the resources (and especially 
land – infrastructure, government facilities like asylums) are however public property of 
the state. They are both “private” property of the state (as an economic actor), public 
goods and so on. Public goods are those goods that the state qualifies them as not being 
scarce so it prevents the act of homesteading
1. In such a situation, no individual who uses 
the resource can become the owner so he has the same rights on the good as any other 
individual in the society. „Hand in hand with the institution of a government comes the 
institution of public property and goods, that is, of property and goods owned collectively 
by all domestic residents and controlled and administered by the government”
2. 
Such a situation creates a huge challenge when the government adopts, for example, 
a totally free immigration policy. Any individual on this world will have the same right to 
walk the street as the owners of nearby houses who walk it every day. These owners do 
not have the right to prevent a foreigner from walking, sleeping or working on that street. 
As long as in a society there are public goods and public property, the immigrants can 
cross the border uninvited by the citizens of the communities of destination. 
As Rothbard concludes, „the private ownership of all streets (that is, public goods) 
would resolve the problem of the „human right” of freedom of immigration”
3. Moreover, 
Hoppe notices that one of the reasons to immigrate is, from a broader perspective, the 
social welfare policies of the host nations (social security being qualified as a public good 
by  authorities).  Due  to  the  redistributionism  in  the  developed  countries,  certain 
individuals from less developed areas are motivated to immigrate only to benefit at least 
from a part of such redistributionism. Foreigners who illegally entered Germany at the 
beginning of the nineties were receiving more money as asylum seekers from the German 
government than the average wage in their home countries. 
 
Edwin G. West
4 makes an interesting parallel between a human society and a joint 
stock company. That is, “suppose that five Scotsmen buy an island and incorporate it in a 
joint  company  in  which  each  of  them  is  allocated  an  equal  share  …  these  five 
shareholders will have the power to exclude any outsiders from entering their island and 
from  participating  in  the  jointly  owned  property  …  the  terms  of  the  agreement  can 
                                                            
1 Homesteading is the act through which individuals who first use an un-owned resource (that 
is,  a  general  condition  of  the  environment  or  an  abandoned  resource)  are  recognized  as  their 
owners. 
2 Hoppe (1998, p. 230). 
3 Rothbard (1962, p. 550). 
4 West (1982, p. 40 and following);  
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include provisions to allow others to purchase entry into the corporation. Among these 
provisions would be the stipulation of the required majority to approve transferability of 
shares”. Even if this scholar agrees that the parallel between public governments and 
private companies are forced, he misses the real difference. While joint ownership allows 
the liberty to exclude because it is still private property, the government does not allow 
such liberty as the public property is something different. First of all, public goods do not 
allow  the  citizens  to  directly  exclude  foreigners  as  such  exclusion  would  mean 
embordering and homesteading of the public goods. The exclusion may be made only by 
the government itself which is elected (let’s simplify) by the majority of citizens of a 
country. But why should the citizens in a different town have a saying in issues that 
matter for a particular town? The majority rule is usually in conflict with the private 
property as the owner of a resource is always in minority with those interested in the use 
of his resources. The scenario in which the majority of the members of a community vote 
to allow an individual member of the community to invite foreigners (to work, live or 
marry) is as aggressive as the scenario of total restriction. 
In consequence, the problem of non-invited migration will endure as long as there is 
any public property. While the state may have the ability to defend “its” property and 
prevent the foreigners from entering it, it also does have different political objectives. In 
fact, the contradicting political objectives of the states prevent them from adopting a 
coherent approach in the immigration policies. 
 
4. Geographically differences in labor prices 
 
Differences in monetary incomes among geographically distinct labor markets are 
always natural. They reveal the local balance between supply and demand for a specific 
type of labor service as labor markets – like any other type of market – also know the 
core  market  mechanism.  When  differences  in  geographical  prices  for  labor  services 
become significant, we may witness the start of a flow of workforce. 
To be sure, not any small difference between two geographic labor markets is in fact 
sufficient to determine individuals to leave their native community in order to work in the 
better rewarding community. The labor is among the stickiest factors of production – as 
compared with capital (in its monetary and even capital goods forms) so the arbitrage 
among geographic labor markets is not the norm on a free market. Ludwig von Mises 
calls this subjective (non-monetary) factors the “attachment component”: “We may call 
the maximum difference between the market rate and the standard rate which does not yet 
result in the migration of workers from the places of lower market wage rates to those of 
higher market wage rates the attachment component”
1. 
Political  institutions  play  however  the  essential  role  on  the  international  labor 
markets. They are the main factors that explain why there are huge differences between 
geographic labor markets in the contemporary international economy, both as a source of 
origin but also as a barrier against arbitrage. 
On a free market, significant differences in geographically distinct labor markets are 
not however the norm. The market process is continuously and incrementally adjusting to 
the natural dynamic of the economy. Exceptional events may disrupt even this natural 
                                                            
1 Mises (http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap21sec9.asp).  
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adjustment. The discovery of gold in the mountain village and the opportunity of earning 
significantly higher incomes may disrupt the labor markets both in the village and in the 
big city in the proximity. Entrepreneurs who discovered the gold will bid the price of the 
workforce until they succeed in getting the gold on the market.  
 
Despite the possibility of such exceptional events, huge differences in prices between 
close geographic markets are not lasting as the cultural, language or other types of “soft” 
barriers will be overcome by the desire of individuals to increase their monetary income. 
Today world is anything but a free market. Political institutions – through positive law 
and  aggressive  action  – have  always  interphered  with  the  natural  mechanisms  of  the 
market and created and maintained huge differences which couldn’t be arbitraged because 
of state barriers. 
 
5.  International  trade,  foreign  direct  investments  and  capital  intensive 
technologies:  alternatives  to  arbitrate  between  international  differences  in  labor 
prices 
 
A huge difference of prosperity like the one between northern Mexico and southern 
United States (across Rio Grande) cannot be the outcome of a free market. Centuries of 
separate  and  antithetic  political  evolution  and  development  of  local  institutions  have 
given birth and widened huge price differentials, both in product markets but also on the 
labour market.   
Such price differentials can generate different types of entrepreneurial action: 
1.  Mexican entrepreneurs will start exporting labour-intensive products across the 
frontier in USA (arbitrage through the product market); 
2.  American entrepreneurs will start businesses in Mexico in order to export back 
into USA such labour intensive products (arbitrage through the location of the production 
assets); 
3.  American entrepreneurs will research and develop capital intensive technologies 
that can balance the more expensive workforce (arbitrage through the technology ideas); 
4.  Mexican workforce will start to migrate into USA in order to offer its cheaper 
services to the American entrepreneurs (arbitrage through the labour market). 
All of these scenarios were confirmed. Through the creation of NAFTA (entered into 
force on 1
st January 1994), products can freely cross the border between the two states. 
Meanwhile, American investments (especially in northern part of Mexico – the so-called 
macquiladoras) have attempted to access directly in Mexico the cheap workforce. As 
Hoppe  points,  „the  relationship  between  trade  and  migration  is  one  of  elastic 
substituibility (rather than rigid exclusivity): the more (or less) you have of one, the less 
(or more) you need of the other. Other things being equal, businesses move to low wage 
areas, and labor moves to high wage areas, thus effecting a tendency towards equalization 
of wage rates (for the same kind of labor) as well as the optimal localization of capital”
1. 
The dilemma is why the first three types of actions have not resulted in a strong trend 
towards  equalization  in  the  price  of  the  workforce.  As  the  market  process  is  free  to 
operate, the prices (goods but also workforce) will also tend to equalize. That is, more 
                                                            
1 Hoppe (1998, p. 224)  
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Mexican and American entrepreneurs will start businesses in Mexico in order to export 
on the US  market, higher their demand for workforce and the price they pay for its 
services. As American entrepreneurs go into Mexico in order to produce for the American 
market, less demand for American workforce in USA and lower its price on the labour 
market.  
The present day situation is however characterized by an amazingly strong flow of 
workforce from Mexico into USA which seems not to be disturbed by the existence of the 
free trade zone or the macquiladoras system. The inability of the products or capital 
goods market to generate a more significant equalization in prices means that other types 
of profound barriers prevent such a dynamic. The inner political institutions of the two 
states seem to operate in such a manner that they determine on a permanent basis the 
effect of income inequalization. The core differences cannot be but in the field of private 
property enforcement: the market incentives can operate only in the case that the basis of 
exchange,  which  are  property  rights,  can  be  exercised.  The  fact  that,  despite  strong 
incentives to move into a direction, the prices refuse to move is a consequence of a wrong 
regime of property rights.  
 
Besides this factor, other elements may operate: 
- taxation: a higher taxation in Mexico means that the increase in income of Mexican 
entrepreneurs and workforce will be wiped out by fiscal authorities; 
- redistributionist policies: a large chunk of the increase in income of the Mexican 
entrepreneurs and workforce will be redistributed through different mechanisms – mainly 
the same taxation but also other ways – to the population not involved in such productive 
activities) and so on; 
- the two mechanisms couldn’t exhaust the supply of labour on the Mexican market 
and the additional supply pressures the wages downwards. 
Several  sociologists  have  noticed  the  challenges  that  such  a  workforce  flow 
determines  in  the  American  society,  especially  in  the  South  Western  states.  Samuel 
Huntington was widely criticized for his article “The Hispanic Challenge”
1 in which he 
noticed that the south west of United States is no longer similar with the rest of the 
country.  He  does  not  hesitate  to  cite  Mexican  writers  who  call  it  “Amexica”  or 
“Mexifornia”. According to Huntington, such a flow of population will change the fabric 
of the American society as the traditional “melting pot”
2 seems to no longer function.  
The alarmist signals of American political scientists however may point in the wrong 
direction. The initial factor that generated the huge Hispanic workforce inflow into USA 
was in fact the decision of American authorities to invite between 1942 and 1966, through 
a guest-workers program called Bracero, a large number of Mexicans (estimated around 4 
millions) as agricultural workers. Such an initiative cannot be clearly qualified as a step in 
the right or in the wrong direction. It clearly allows certain individuals to have a choice 
and  obtain  higher  incomes  in  USA  but  because  it  is  a  controlled  workflow,  the 
equalization in the labour market cannot be accomplished. In fact, such a political project 
                                                            
1 Huntington (2004, p. 30). 
2  The  concept  of  „melting  pot”  signifies  the  fact  that  when  immigrants  join  a  foreign 
community, they will abandon their former identity and totally adhere to the culture, values and 
customs of the new community they belong to.  
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cannot reveal but failure of governance of the two countries. 
From the part of Mexico, the core reason is easily to detect: the need to reduce the 
social pressures on the internal labour market. High unemployment and slow growth may 
be the fundamental factors that pressured the Mexican government in this direction. In a 
certain  sense,  we  may  also  speculate  that  Ciudad  de  Mexico  anticipated  the  later 
developments and the demographic expansion of Mexicans into South Western USA. 
From the part of United States, the main motivation is also easy to understand. Such 
a program cannot be but the result of the desire to artificially maintain certain sectors 
competitive  by  supplying  them  cheap  labour. That  is,  this  above  mentioned  program 
allowed  the  southern-western  states  an  improvement  –  albeit  artificial  –  in  the  cost 
structure  of  agricultural  production.  That  is,  such  a  program  allowed  the  American 
agricultural producers from the south to be competitive towards Third World competitors 
on  the  national  –  and  maybe  international  markets.  The  interesting  thing  is  that  the 
program may have dramatically reduced even Mexican agricultural exports into USA 
because they lost their labour cost advantage and maybe even the quality of the labour 
services (as some argue that the best agricultural workforce used the opportunity of the 
Bracero  program).  We  may  also  imagine  the  motivation  that  all  these  guest  workers 
spread a positive image about the prosperity in USA and fight the left wing policies in 
Latin America. 
The case of Mexico and USA is just the most manifest discrepancy of development 
and income in close geographic markets. However, the situation is by all means the same 
all  over  the  world.  Western  Europe  and  Eastern  Europe  know  the  same  income 
differentials, similar borders with the Mexican – American one being, from this point of 
view, the Greek – Bulgarian or the German - Polish.  The European Union knows a 
similar situation than United States of America. Its Mexicans are the Eastern Europeans 
and North Africans.  
 
All these situations around the world reveal the same failures in political governances 
of both the home countries and the visited countries. Even if the term slave isn’t, for sure, 
the proper one (the individual who make the choice has the liberty not to go to work 
abroad), it is purely and simply a political bargain that offers political benefits to both 
states. Such a bargain allows both governances to continue with the status quo and avoid 
troubling political and economic reforms. As ILO reports argue, “there would appear to 
be an emerging convergence of interests between richer and poorer countries. In simple 
terms, the former are running short of working-age people, while the latter have such 
people to spare”
1. The normal consequence of such a demographic development would be 
a change in the nature of technology used in these socities. In a developped country 
where the natality is reducing and labor become scarce, businesses should adopt more 
capital intensive technologies and less labor intensive technologies. They should allow, 
finally,  the  free  relocation  of  labor  intensive  production  in  low  income  countries. 




                                                            
1 GCIM (2005, p. 24).  
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Conclusions 
In today world economy, we may state that when products and investments do not 
freely cross the border, the workforce will. The temporary work migration is the clearest 
sign of the failure of political governance in both the host and native states, even if we 
may argue, to a different degree. Such a trend however determines strong challenges that 
may  alter  demographic  and  political  communities  and  have  long-term  effects.  Today 
world may witness, in a larger extent than in the past, the emergence of “societies inside 
societies”.  The  traditional  “melting  pot”  seems  to  no  longer  operate.  Because  of 
communication technology or maybe deeper political factors, today immigrants are no 
longer integrating into the host societies.  
As Hoppe concludes, „insofar as the US engaged in protectionist policies against the 
products of low-wage area and in welfare policies at home, immigration pressure would 
be kept high or even raised”
1. Such a conclusion confirms that the only way to reduce the 
pressure  of  immigration  in  developed  countries  would  be  to  allow  a  freer  global 
environment,  in  trade,  industrial  and  taxation  policies.  In  a  world  with  increasing 
differences in incomes, such a prospect is not very close. And the fabric of Occidental 
societies will change as a result of the amplitude of foreign migration as well as the 
failure to integrate these individuals into the societies. Labor migration penalizes failures 
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